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This paper compares the saving behavior of formal and informal workers and 
additionally provides a socioeconomic and financial characterization of informal 
workers in Chile. The paper uses the Financial Household Survey conducted by 
the Central Bank of Chile in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, which covers between 
1,740 and 2,533 urban households, performing both OLS and probit regressions. 
The cross-section regression results indicate that, in general, informal households 
save less than formal households. Further, descriptive data indicate that informal 
workers have less access to financial services and possess less financial assets and 
liabilities. In terms of policy implications, combating informality may not only 
improve the well-being of workers, but may also have positive consequences on 
the aggregate saving rate. In addition, for Chile, it is evident that there is ample 
room to improve access to financial services not only for informal but also for 
formal workers. 
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One of the main problems facing Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) is the relatively low 
levels of saving, especially if compared with other regions of the world, such as East Asia and 
the Pacific (EAP), that have shown greater dynamism in saving rates. For example, Gutiérrez 
(2007) presents evidence that on average the saving rate for LAC between 2000 and 2003 was 
19.2 percent, while EAP countries had a mean saving rate of 34.5 percent. Further, Reinhardt 
(2008) provides evidence that the average gross domestic saving for LAC was 17.1 percent in the 
1990s, compared to 24.8 percent for a group of 25 developing middle-income countries. In the 
2000s, according to Pérez Monteiro, Cavalcante Ferreira and Radusweski Quintal (2014), the 
average gross saving rate was 20 percent for LAC and 30 percent for EAP. With respect to Chile, 
although it has a higher average saving rate than most other LAC countries, its average of 22.3 
percent for the 2000-2003 period is still low if compared to EAP countries (Gutiérrez, 2007).   
Another important concern in the region is related to the high levels of informal 
employment that are prevalent. Although the 2000s have seen a reduction in the informality 
figures in comparison to the 1990s, informality affects between 37.7 percent and 88.4 percent of 
total workers in LAC (Tornarolli et al., 2014). In the case of Chile, the country has the lowest 
levels of informality in the region and has been facing a mild downward trend from 40.6 percent 
in 1990 to 37.7 percent in 2009. According to Perticara and Celhay (2010), informality declined 
from 39.5 percent in 1998 to 35.8 percent in 2006. However, when that total is disaggregated 
disaggregating between salaried workers and self-employed workers, the figures in 2006 were 
24.9 percent and 71.6 percent, respectively. Evidently, by disaggregating by type of worker some 
heterogeneity appears, where it is evident that self-employed workers suffer a much higher level 
of informality than salaried workers.  
A natural question that arises is whether these two phenomena are interrelated and 
whether the prevalent high informality rates prevent the proper channeling of savings into the 
formal financial system. Clearly, this could have implications on the efficient allocation of 
surpluses to increase investment and economic growth. Thus, studying the relationship between 
household saving and informality could allow governments to develop appropriate policies to 
influence aggregate saving rates. However, although there is abundant research analyzing the 
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main determinants of saving for the region,1 studies on how informality affects saving and 
how/why informal workers save is almost non-existent. A notable exception is the recent work 
by Granda and Hamann (2014), who build a theoretical occupational choice model to calibrate it 
with data for Colombia and analyze the effect of several formalization policies on saving. The 
underlying argument is that if informal workers have a more uncertain and variable income 
stream, we would expect that informal workers have a higher saving rate due to precautionary 
motives. On the other hand, Dupas and Robinson (2013) find that simply providing a safe place 
to keep money was sufficient to increase health saving by 66 percent in an experiment in Kenya. 
This study may support the argument that informal workers save less than formal workers 
because they are less financially included. Finally, Ogbuabor, Malaolu and Mba (2013) use time-
series analysis for Nigeria and find that informality hinders the growth of domestic saving. 
Although these studies reach potentially interesting conclusions, more micro-level empirical 
evidence on the link between informality and saving is needed. 
The objective of this paper is to empirically study the saving behavior of formal and 
informal workers in Chile, following the microeconomic approach of the pioneering studies of 
Attanasio and Székely (2000) and Butelmann and Gallego (2000). Following both OLS and 
probit estimation techniques, we econometrically test whether there are any differences in the 
saving behavior of formal and informal households. Although we do not econometrically study 
the potential reasons for the differential saving behavior of informal and formal households, we 
present survey results that characterize how and why informal and formal workers save. In terms 
of data, we use the microdata from the Financial Household Survey prepared by the Central 
Bank of Chile for 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, which surveys between 1,740 and 2,533 
households. A novelty of this survey for LAC is that it surveys not only income, expenditure and 
household characteristics, but also the structure and level of household assets and liabilities with 
a high degree of detail. Moreover, it surveys restrictions to credit access for households, 
expectations about households’ future levels of saving, access to insurance markets and various 
other determinants of saving. Thus, we are able not only to compare the saving rate of formal 
and informal households, but also to analyze the types of financial instruments selected by such 
households. Clearly, this database allows us to study in much more detail the saving pattern and 
                                                          
1 For Latin America, the following articles may be mentioned: Attanasio and Székely (2000) for Mexico and Peru, 
Attanasio and Székely (1998) for Mexico, Lorenzo and Osimani (2001) for Uruguay, Butelmann and Gallego (2000) 
for Chile, and Sandoval-Hernández (2011) for Mexico. 
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financial behavior of households than previous studies, which use databases with focus on labor 
and expenditure characteristics, such as the CASEN survey in Chile, the EPH survey in 
Argentina, the PNAD survey in Brazil or the ENAHO survey in Peru (Maurizio, 2012). 
This study is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on saving in order to 
discuss different theoretical and empirical findings, especially for LAC. This survey allows us to 
establish the most relevant variables affecting saving, which not only help us in our empirical 
strategy but also allow us to compare our estimation results with that of the literature. In Section 
3, we undertake a descriptive analysis of formal versus informal workers, paying particular 
attention to the socioeconomic characteristics and financial and saving behavior of workers in 
each group. Section 4 presents the data and econometric methodology that have been used to 
analyze whether informal households save less than formal households. The section additionally 
discusses the main results and findings. In Section 5, we provide several robustness tests. Finally, 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Survey of the Literature on Saving 
 
Until the mid-1950, the prevailing Keynesian view was that the main determinant of the level of 
saving was the current income and it was assumed that both people and countries with higher 
incomes had a higher saving rate than poorer people or countries (Deaton, 2005). Furthermore, 
saving was seen as a potential source of macroeconomic instability (Modigliani, 1986). 
However, Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) and Friedman (1957) proposed a new theoretical 
framework with a similar interpretation of motivations for saving. Modigliani, in particular, took 
the intertemporal maximization notion of Fisher and combined it with the idea that people aim to 
smooth consumption, saving in their active stage of life in order to finance their consumption 
expenditures in retirement age. The proposition of Modigliani had novel implications, 
introducing a new determinant of saving, namely retirement. In its simplest version, the model 
had predictions that went contrary to the prevailing beliefs of the economic thinking at that time. 
On the one hand, he argued, as Friedman (1957), that the saving rate does not depend on current 
income but on transitory income, which means that low-income countries or people may have 
greater saving rates than those with greater resources. In addition, the model predicts a higher 
level of saving in those countries that have a longer duration of retirement period. Further, it 
establishes a relationship between the saving rate and population growth and productivity. He 
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also became a reference for the study of the effects of population aging on pension systems and 
the overall performance of an economy. Among the empirical papers that support the theory of 
Modigliani, the following, among many others, may be mentioned: Butelmann and Gallego 
(2000) for Chile, Attanasio (1998) for the United States, Beckmann, and Hake and Urvova 
(2013) for Eastern Europe. 
Among the criticism the Modigliani hypothesis has received, the following can be 
mentioned. The empirical study of Carroll and Summers (1991) finds evidence that consumption 
growth follows closely income growth over the life cycle in the studied countries. Other authors, 
such as Deaton (2005), Carroll (1997), and Belke, Dreger and Ochmann (2012), suggest that 
people in their retirement period do save rather than dissave. However, a possible explanation for 
this result is that they consider pensions as income and not as dissaving (Deaton, 2005; 
Butelmann and Gallego, 2000). In addition, Abdelkhalek et al. (2010) perform a 
microeconometric study for Moroccan households and find no evidence of the existence of the 
life cycle theory. Further, Deaton (1992) made a comparison between Thailand, which has 
shown an extended period of strong growth, and the Ivory Coast, with no or a low level of 
income growth over the same period. This author argues that if the lifecycle theory is correct, 
and assuming that both countries have the same preference structure, in Thailand the 
consumption profiles should peak at younger ages than in Ivory Coast, showing that young 
people are much richer than their predecessors in the Asian country. However, this author finds 
that consumption profiles do peak at younger ages in Ivory Coast rather than in Thailand, which 
would be evidence against the life cycle theory. 
Beyond the discussion of the Modigliani hypothesis, there is plenty of evidence on other 
determinants of saving. Most studies show that the saving rate is strongly influenced by the level 
of current income and educational level (Butelmann and Gallego, 2000; Attanasio and Székely, 
2000; Beckmann, Hake and Urkova, 2013; and Xiao, 1996). Beckmann, Hake and Urkova 
(2013) go further and suggest that education generates a higher propensity to save using more 
diversified savings instruments and that these results are not exclusively due to the expectation of 
future higher earnings. In addition, most of the international evidence on the study of the 
response of the level of saving to the interest rate indicates that the interest rate has no significant 
influence on the level of saving (Repetto, 2001). Accordingly, Repetto (2001) claims that 
measures focused on financial education with creation of illiquid instruments that deliver 
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immediate rewards would be a more effective strategy to increase saving than using the interest 
rate. In addition, Bennett, Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) find in their analysis of a panel of 
aggregate data that there is a partial compensation relationships between public and private 
saving, meaning that policies promoting saving would have only a limited effect on aggregate 
saving, partially validating the Ricardian equivalence theory.  
Attanasio and Székely (2000) find that one of the main explanations for the differences in 
saving rate of households is explained by demographic shifts in the relative size of the age 
groups that produce and save, which overall have increased. Moreover, household dependency 
ratios, i.e., the number of people under 15 or over 65 who are mostly inactive occupationally, is 
another variable that is often used in studies on saving behavior of households. The expected 
coefficient is negative, as confirmed by Butelmann and Gallego (2000), Xiao (1996), Bennett, 
Loayza and Schmidt-Hebbel (2000) and Deaton (2005). However, Beckmann, Hake and Urvova 
(2013) claims that families with children save more. With regard to the gender of the household 
head, Butelmann and Gallego (2000) finds that female-headed households save more, a possible 
explanation being that they face a higher uncertainty due to raising their children alone. Another 
hypothesis is given by Beckmann, Hake and Urvova (2013) that claim that for Eastern Europe 
this may be due to the fact that women have a higher life expectancy. The same authors further 
suggest that marital status is another important variable and that married people save more. In 
addition, according to Lorenzo and Osimani (2001) for Uruguay, Denes et al. (2011) for 
Argentina, and Beckmann, Hake and Urvova (2013), larger families save more. 
Another reason to save is the precautionary motive (Browning and Lusardi, 1996). It is 
expected that families who have unemployment insurance, life insurance coverage and possess 
durable goods have a lower rate of saving, as there is a lower risk of falling household income. 
Following this line of thought, households including informal workers may save more due to 
precautionary motives. Lorenzo and Osimani (2001) find that there is differential behavior of 
lower income households, which a priori could resemble informal households. Further, Attanasio 
and Székely (2000) argue that difficulties in accessing social welfare systems, as is the case for 
informal workers, can generate a much less synchronized retirement age and therefore show a 
curve with a lower saving “hump.” Moreover, if there are restrictions on credit access, 
households may save more to face periods of low income (Deaton, 1992; Carroll, 1998; 
Butellman and Gallego, 2000; and Alvarado Díaz-Romero, 2010). In addition, recent work by 
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Ogbuabor, Malaolu and Mba (2013) uses time-series analysis and finds that for Nigeria 
informality hinders the growth of domestic saving. Further, Granda and Hamann (2014) build a 
theoretical occupational choice model to calibrate it with data for Colombia and analyze the 
effect of several formalization policies on saving. Although they reach potentially interesting 
conclusions, more micro-level empirical evidence on the link between informality and saving is 
needed. 
 
3. Characterizing Informality in Chile 
 
This paper uses data from the Financial Household Survey conducted by the Central Bank of 
Chile in 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, which is a Chilean urban survey including demographic, 
economic, financial and social indicators.2 While for 2007 the survey covers 3,828 households 
from the whole country, for 2008, 2009 and 2010 the survey covers 1,207, 1,190 and 2,037 
households, respectively, from the metropolitan region of Santiago de Chile. 
In terms of the definition of informality, although this concept has certain ambiguities, 
both in terms of the empirical measurement and the theoretical definition, in this paper we follow 
the most common definitions found in the literature, namely the social protection definition and 
the productive definition (Kanbur, 2009; Tornarolli et al., 2014). While the social protection 
definition stresses non-compliance with labor legislation in terms of labor protection and social 
security benefits, the productive definition includes the level of productivity of jobs and the skills 
needed for carrying out those jobs to characterize informality. 
Concretely, the social protection definition (ILOD definition) defines an informal worker 
as a salaried or a self-employed worker who does not contribute to a pension (or retirement) 
plan.3 Further, we classify as informal those salaried workers who report not having an 
employment contract, even if they contribute to a pension plan. This definition has previously 
been used by Perticara and Celhay (2010) in their study of informality in Chile.   
In terms of the productive definition (PD definition), we define an informal worker as 
one who falls under one of the following categories: i) a self-employed worker without a tertiary 
or superior education degree, ii) a salaried worker in a small private firm with five or less 
                                                          
2 For more details on the survey and its methodology, please visit the following link: 
http://www.bcentral.cl/estadisticas-economicas/financiera-hogares/index.htm 
3 It is important to mention that until 2015 self-employed workers in Chile were not obliged to contribute to a 
pension plan.  
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employees, or iii) an unremunerated family member. Given that an individual could have more 
than one job, we apply the classification only to his/her main occupation. This definition of 
informal workers is similar to the one used by Tornarolli et al. (2014). 
Further, we construct a third definition of informality that combines the above definitions 
(COMBD definition), i.e., an informal worker is a worker that is informal according to both the 
ILOD definition and the PD definition. Clearly, this is a much more restrictive definition of 
informality. 
 
3.1 Informality Rates and Social Attributes 
 
In Figure 1, we present the informality rates for Chile in 2007 according to the three definitions 
of informality discussed above.4 According to the social protection definition (ILOD), around 
36.7 percent of the work force in Chile is informal, or around 2.49 million of the country’s 
almost 6.8 million worker. Note that Chile had a total population of around 16.5 million and a 
41.1 employment rate in 2007.5 In terms of the productive definition (PD), the informality rate is 
28.6 percent, which implies that around 19.4 million Chilean workers were informal. For the 
third definition, which combines the social protection and the productive definition (COMBD), 
the informality rate is 19.7 percent, which represents 1.33 million workers. Note, however, that 
as this definition is stricter, it also means that many workers who are informal according to one 
definition but not the other (either the ILOD or the PD) would be considered non-informal 
workers. From Table 1, we see that 1,158 million workers are informal according to the ILOD 
definition but not according to the PD definition, 606 thousand are informal according to the PD 
definition but not for the ILOD definition, and that 3.69 million are formal according to both 
definitions. Thus, the exclusion of these workers from the informal group is the reason for the 
rate being lower than the other two definitions of informality. If we compare pure groups, i.e., 
the number of formal/informal workers who comply with both definitions, we would obtain an 
informality rate of 26.6 percent. Note also that in Subsections 3.2 and 3.3 and Section 4, when 
comparing different financial attributes and behavior of informal and formal workers using this 
                                                          
4 We present the data for 2007 because for this year the survey covers more households from the whole country. 
However, the results for the other years do not change our main conclusions. The results are available upon request 
from the authors. 
5 Note also that the EFH survey is an urban survey, but we are assuming that employment and informality figures of 
rural workers can be derived from urban workers. In 2007, the Chilean urban population was 12.14 million and the 
rural population was 4.36 million. 
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strict definition of informality, we will use pure groups of formal and informal workers in order 
to avoid possible distortion of results caused by workers who are informal by one definition but 
not the other.  
 











In Figure 2, we present the results of informality rates when discriminating between 
genders. The informality rates for women are 39.7 percent, 33.1 percent and 23.1 percent 
according to the ILOD, PD and COMBD definitions, respectively. For men, in contrast, the 
informality rates are 34.6 percent, 25.5 percent, 17.3 percent. Clearly, informality affects more 















Source: Financial Survey of Households (2007). Central Bank of Chile
Informality Rates
ILOD PD COMBD
Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons % Persons %
no 1,416,956 50.2% 283,191 10.0% 1,700,147 60.3% 2,277,892 57.3% 323,536 8.1% 2,601,428 65.4%
yes 470,100 16.7% 650,326 23.1% 1,120,426 39.7% 687,998 17.3% 689,399 17.3% 1,377,397 34.6%














In case of classifying the different definitions of informality by income groups, a clear 
picture emerges. As can be seen in Figure 3, informality affects more those workers with lower 
incomes. In stratum 1, consisting of households in the income deciles 1-5, 46.6 percent (ILOD), 
41.4 percent (PD) and 31.1 percent (COMBD) of workers are informal. In stratum 2, 
corresponding to persons belonging to households positioned in income deciles 6-8, 33.9 percent 
(ILOD), 26.2 percent (PD) and 16.9 percent (COMBD) of the employed are informal. In stratum 
3, for workers belonging to households in deciles 9 and 10 of income, the informality rate falls to 
28.2 percent (ILOD), 15.8 percent (PD) and 9 percent (COMBD). 
Educational level shows also a negative relationship with the rate of informality, as can 
be seen in Figure 4. Workers with primary or less education levels have informality rates of 56.9 
percent, 55.3 percent and 43.7 percent for the ILOD, PD and COMBD definitions, respectively. 
In addition, 34.3 percent (ILOD), 33.3 percent (PD) and 20.8 percent (COMBD) of workers with 
secondary education are informal. Further, while workers with tertiary or undergraduate 
university degree have informality rates of 30.1 percent (ILOD), 6.7 percent (PD), and 3.9 
percent (COMBD), workers with a postgraduate university degree have rates of 22.5 percent 
(ILOD), 3 percent (PD), and 1.2 percent (COMBD). Note also that the reduction of the 
informality rate between lower education levels and higher education levels for the PD and 


















Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile




construction of the PD definition, where self-employed workers with lower education levels are 
assumed to be informal. 
 








As Figure 5 shows, informality is not distributed evenly by age groups. Clearly, 
informality affects more workers older than 65 years, who have rates of 71.4 percent (ILOD), 
48.6 percent (PD) and 42.8 percent (COMBD). The second most affected group is old middle-
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Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile
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Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile




percent (PD) and 22.8 percent (COMBD). In third place are young workers aged between 15 to 
25, who have informality rates of 39.3 percent (ILOD), 18.6 percent (PD) and 14 percent 
(COMBD). Finally, we observe that the age group least affected by informality is the young 
middle-aged between 26 and 39 years, who have informality rates of 29 percent, 21.4 percent 
and 13.1 percent for the ILOD, PD and COMB definitions, respectively. Note, however, that if 
we only consider the ILOD definition of informality, the second most affected group are young 
workers and in third place are old middle-aged workers. 
 




3.2 Informality and Access to Financial Services 
 
In this subsection we compare informal and formal households in terms of access to financial 
services using data for 2007.6 Note that we define informal (formal) households as those where 
all the members that are occupied are informal (formal) workers. This imply that we discard 
households that have no member working or where there are some members that are informal 
and some that are formal workers. Again, we use the three different informality definitions. For 
the ILOD definition, we end up having 684 informal households and 1,891 formal households. 
Regarding the PD definition, we have 431 informal households and 2,346 formal households. 
                                                          
























15 to 25 26 to 39 40 to 65 more than 65
Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile




Finally, for the COMBD definition we have 284 informal households and 1,620 formal 
households. 
We constructed four variables that proxy access to financial services, namely: 
 
1. Possess  bank account; 
2. Possess credit card;  
3. Possess a debit card; and  
4. Face credit constraints 
 
The variable “possess bank account” indicates households where the head of the 
household reports having a bank account. In addition, the variables “possess credit card” and 
“possess debit card” indicate households where there is at least one member who uses a credit 
card and debit card, respectively. Further, households that face credit constrains are those that 
have applied for credit in the last two years and have suffered at least one rejection of the 
application. In addition, we also consider that a household is credit constrained if they have been 
granted credit but they have not accepted it because they consider the conditions of credit to be 
unfavorable. Further, we consider a household to be credit constrained if they have been granted 
a credit but the amount granted is less than what was applied. Finally, we also consider that a 
household is credit constrained if members do not apply for a credit because they believe that 
they will not be granted credit or believe they will not be able to afford paying to back the 
credit.7  
From Figure 6, it is clear that there is a much higher proportion of heads of formal 
households who possess a bank account than heads of informal households. For the ILOD 
definition, while 25.1 percent of heads of formal households report having a bank account, only 
9.9 percent of heads of informal households possess a bank account. This comparison is 26.6 
percent versus 5.9 percent for the PD definition and 27 percent versus 4.6 percent for the 
COMBD definition. 
  
                                                          
7 All these questions are available in the Financial Household Survey conducted by the Central Bank of Chile in 
2007, which allow us to construct the single variable “Face credit constraints.” 
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Regarding the use of credit cards, we see in Figure 7 that a higher proportion of formal 
households (between 17.4 percent and 18.6 percent) use credit cards than informal households 
(between 11.9 percent and 13.2 percent). Again, this pattern is consistent for the three definitions 
of informality. 
With respect to the use of debit cards, from Figure 8 we find a pattern similar to that for 
the use of credit cards, ranging between 12.9 percent and 13.9 percent for formal households that 
use debit cards and between 0 percent and 3.9 percent for informal households. Note that the use 
of debit cards is much less extensive than the use of credit cards. A possible explanation is that 
debit cards are associated with the possession of a bank account, while credit cards are 
increasingly being issued by department and retail stores without the need of having a bank 
account.  
 




















Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile













In Figure 9, we see that there is a higher proportion of informal households that suffer 
credit constraints in comparison with formal households. While between 44.9 percent and 49.1 
percent of informal households suffer credit constraints, only 33.7 percent to 36.2 percent of 
formal households are credit constrained Clearly, this pattern is consistent across all three 
definitions of informality. Moreover, for all four variables that capture access to financial 


















Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile

















Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile








3.3 Informality and Households’ Assets and Liabilities 
 
The database that we use allows us to analyze the proportion of households that have assets and 
liabilities and compare formal and informal households. In terms of assets, we distinguish 
between real assets, such as motor vehicles, primary residence and other real states, and financial 
assets, such as fixed-income assets (saving accounts, retirement saving plan and term deposits) 
and variable-income assets (shareholding, mutual and investment funds and business 
partnership). Further, we also have data on households’ liabilities, such as bank credit card debt, 
personal loans by banks, other bank credit, mortgage loans, retail store credit card debt, personal 
loans by retail stores and other financial companies, credit by credit unions, car loans, student 
loans, loans by family and friends, pawnshop credit, purchases on credit and other debts.   
From Table 2, it is clear that there is a higher proportion of formal households that 
possess assets in comparison to informal households for 2007 in Chile. Although there is not 
much difference between formal and informal households in terms of ownership of primary 
residence, it is clear that a higher proportion of formal households possess a motor vehicle and 
other real states. Furthermore, the difference is particularly notable in terms of financial assets, 
especially for variable-income assets such as shareholding, mutual and investment funds and 
business partnership. Note also that beyond the difference between formal and informal 
households, possession of financial assets by households is quite low in general, especially if 


















Source: Financial Survey of Households(2007). Central Bank of Chile




With respect to liabilities, it is also clear that a higher proportion of formal households 
are indebted in comparison to informal households. The difference is especially important for 
loans granted by banks, such as debt by bank-issued credit cards, personal loans by banks, other 
bank credit, and mortgage loans. However, when analyzing the loans granted by retail stores 
(credit card or personal loans) the difference between formal and informal households is less 
important. Another interesting pattern is that credit card penetration by retail stores is much 
larger than for bank-issued credit cards. Clearly, retail stores provide an important source of 
financing for both formal and informal households. Finally, although a small proportion of 
households take loans from family and friends and from pawnshops, they are the only categories 
of liabilities where informal households have a higher percentage than formal households. These 
results may suggest that informal households have a greater tendency to seek credit through more 
informal channels. 
 
Table 2. Proportion of Formal and Informal Households with Assets and Liabilities 
 
  
Proportion of formal and informal households with assets and liabilities 
Assets Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Real assets 81,2% 72,8% 78,8% 78,4% 79,2% 73,1%
Motor vehicles 41,3% 30,5% 42,3% 29,0% 42,0% 26,5%
Primary residence 67,2% 63,5% 65,5% 68,4% 65,8% 66,4%
Other real states 12,2% 8,1% 12,4% 9,0% 11,6% 6,1%
Financial assets 14,9% 7,4% 15,8% 6,6% 15,4% 5,9%
Fixed-income assets 11,1% 6,5% 11,7% 5,7% 11,6% 5,9%
Savings account 10,1% 6,5% 10,5% 5,5% 10,2% 5,8%
Retirement savings plan 3,2% 0,4% 3,0% 0,9% 3,3% 0,5%
Term deposit 1,6% 0,4% 1,6% 0,3% 1,8% 0,4%
Variable-income assets 5,7% 1,2% 6,1% 0,9% 5,8% 0,0%
Shareholding 2,8% 0,5% 3,0% 0,1% 2,8% 0,0%
Mutual and investment funds 3,5% 1,1% 4,4% 0,4% 4,2% 0,3%
Business partnership 1,3% 0,4% 1,1% 0,7% 1,1% 0,0%
Liabilities Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Indebted  65,8% 51,0% 64,5% 50,8% 67,1% 47,4%
Bank credit card debt 15,1% 6,5% 16,2% 3,6% 16,9% 3,9%
Personal loans by banks 15,5% 9,2% 15,3% 8,4% 15,7% 7,2%
Other bank credit 8,3% 5,5% 9,2% 3,5% 9,0% 3,9%
Mortgage loans 16,7% 6,0% 16,8% 5,0% 17,7% 3,9%
Retail  store credit card debt 56,1% 43,6% 55,8% 43,8% 58,4% 42,8%
Personal loans by retail  stores and other financial companies 6,0% 4,8% 5,7% 5,2% 5,9% 5,0%
Credit by credit unions 8,1% 4,0% 8,2% 4,7% 9,3% 5,6%
Car loans 1,9% 1,6% 2,2% 1,6% 1,9% 1,4%
Student loans 4,9% 3,1% 5,8% 1,1% 5,4% 0,8%
Loans by family and friends 1,0% 2,9% 1,6% 1,5% 1,3% 2,2%
Pawnshop credit 0,0% 1,1% 0,2% 0,5% 0,1% 0,8%
Bought on credit 1,4% 1,1% 1,5% 0,7% 1,3% 0,6%
Other debts 3,0% 2,4% 2,7% 2,9% 2,6% 2,2%
ILO Definition Productive Definition Combined Definition
Source: Financial Survey of Households (2007); Central Bank of Chile
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3.4 Informality and Saving Behavior 
 
In this subsection we analyze the saving rates of households, discriminating by different 
percentiles of income and between formal and informal households for 2007. Further, we present 
data on the percentage of households that report being able to save (not save) in the last year, 
discriminating by formal and informal households. In addition, we present data on households’ 
reported reasons for saving in 2007. Finally, we present the average saving rate for 2008, 2009 
and 2010, discriminating between formal and informal households. The first step is to 
conceptualize saving since there are a great diversity of definitions, with some preponderance for 
the standard notion of total family income, net of retirement contributions and health insurance, 
minus total household expenditures, including durable goods, health expenses and educational 
expenses. These last three items are suggested as an unconventional form of saving by, among 
others, Attanasio (1998) and Butelmann and Gallego (2000). Furthermore, Deaton (2005) points 
out, as a criticism, that usually household surveys include the incomes of young people without 
their contributions to the pension system and consider the income of retirees as income and not 
as dissaving. These two effects may contribute to underestimating saving by young people and 
dissaving by retirees. 
Following the above mentioned literature and benefiting from the richness of the 
Financial Household Survey, we use the following five saving definitions: 
 
1. Definition 1 (SR1): Saving is the difference between total household income, 
net of retirement contributions and health insurance, and consumption 
expenditures. The saving rate is given by saving divided by total household 
income. Total household income includes imputed rent of own property or 
leased property for free. Consumption expenditures include all surveyed 
expenses. 
2. Definition 2 (SR2): As in definition 1 (SR1), but excluding pension incomes 
from total household income. 
3. Definition 3 (SR3): As in definition 1 (SR1), but considering spending on 
education and health as saving; i.e., consumption expenditures excludes 
education and health spending. 
4. Definition 4 (SR4): As in definition 1 (SR1), but excluding pension incomes 
from total household income and considering spending on education and 
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health as saving; i.e., consumption expenditures excludes education and health 
spending. 
5. Definition 5 (SR5): A dichotomous variable that assumes value 1 if the head 
of the household reports that the household’s income has been greater than its 
expenses in the last 12 months (i.e., they have been able to save) and 0 
otherwise. 
 
In Figure 10 we present the saving rates by income percentile using definition SR1, 
discriminating between formal and informal households according to the ILOD definition for 
2007. Two main conclusions are evident. Firstly, for all the different income percentiles, formal 
households have larger saving rates than informal households. Secondly, saving rates are 
increasing in the level of income for both formal and informal households; i.e., households with 
higher incomes have greater saving rates. These two results are confirmed in Figures 11, 12 and 
13 for the SR2, SR3 and SR4 definitions of the saving rate, respectively.8 Note, however, that for 
the SR2 definition the saving rates are slightly lower in general than the SR1, SR3 and SR4 
definitions. Further, the saving rates of the SR3 definitions are in general slightly higher than for 
the other two definitions. These differences are due to the different components included in the 
specific definitions of saving rates. Note also that for the lowest income percentile in the SR2 
definition, we get negative saving rates for informal households. This result shows the 
importance of pension incomes for informal low-income households. 
 
  
                                                          
8 We reach the same conclusions using the PD and COMBD definitions of informality, which are not presented due 
to space considerations, but are available upon request from the authors.  
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Table 3 presents the percentage of households that report having saved (not saved) in the 
last year, discriminating between formal and informal households according to the different 
informality definitions. Note that these are the results for the SR5 definition of saving. Similarly 
to the results for the other definitions of saving, we find that the percentage of formal households 
that save is greater than the percentage of informal households that save for all three definitions 
of informality. Equivalently, we find that the percentage of formal households that do not save is 
lower than the percentage of informal households that have not saved in the last year. 
 




In Table 4, we present the reported motives for saving, distinguishing between formal 
and informal households according to the three different informality definitions used in this 
paper. Note that the data are presented as a percentage of households, including those households 
that do not report saving for any reason, and that households could select one or more reasons; 
i.e., the different motives are not mutually exclusive. The principal reason for saving for both 
formal and informal households is precautionary motive. Note, however, that a larger proportion 
of formal households than informal households report this reason. This result can be somewhat 
counterintuitive if we assume that informal households have less stability in their employments 
and a larger variation in their income streams, and would, thus, have more incentives for 
precautionary saving. Another interesting result is that a larger proportion of informal 
households than formal households state that they save for retirement. This is an intuitive result 
if we consider that the informality definitions imply that informal workers are less covered by 
contributory retirement plans than formal workers. Note also that there is no other reason for 
saving for which informal households report a higher percentage than formal households (an 
exception with mixed results is the health and education reason). Further, it is interesting to note 
that a larger proportion of formal households than informal households report saving in order to 
reduce debt. This may be an intuitive result if we consider that, in general and from Table 2, a 
smaller proportion of informal households are indebted. 
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Not saved 64.2% 77.7% 66.3% 77.0% 64.8% 79.7%
Saved 35.8% 22.3% 33.7% 23.0% 35.2% 20.3%
ILOD PD COMBD








In Figure 14 we present the evolution of the median saving rates for definition 1 (SR1) 
for the years 2008, 2009 and 2010, discriminating between formal and informal households 
following the ILOD definition. Note that we are not including 2007 because, while the survey for 
2007 includes the urban population of the whole country, the surveys for 2008, 2009 and 2010 
include only the urban population of the metropolitan region of Santiago de Chile, which implies 
that these saving rates are not completely comparable. In terms of the results and in line with the 
results for 2007, it is clear from the figure that informal households have lower saving rates than 
formal households. In terms of the time pattern, we observe that the median saving rates increase 
in 2009 with respect to 2008 and 2010. Another interesting pattern is that the median saving rate 
of informal households increases relatively more in 2009 and falls relatively more in 2010 than 
that of formal households. Although these patterns may be related to the effects of the 2009 
crisis,9 we should be cautious with this inference because the 2008 survey collected data between 
December 2008 and March 2009, i.e., in the middle of the 2009 crisis, and the 2009 survey 
between November 2009 and March 2010, when the economy had already resumed growth. 
 
  
                                                          
9 Note that in Chile, as in most other Latin American countries, the effects of the 2007/2008 financial crisis were 
only felt in 2009 when commodity prices fell abruptly. The effects were short-lived because commodity prices 
recovered soon thereafter. 
Reported reason for household saving
Formal Informal Formal Informal Formal Informal
Precautionary 24.1% 17.9% 22.2% 20.3% 23.4% 18.0%
Retirement 7.7% 10.4% 8.2% 10.8% 7.7% 12.7%
Durable goods 9.5% 8.1% 9.3% 9.4% 9.1% 8.2%
Health and education 8.8% 7.4% 8.3% 11.3% 7.9% 9.7%
Heritage 0.7% 1.1% 0.9% 0.5% 0.8% 0.7%
Save 9.4% 6.8% 9.2% 6.7% 9.4% 6.3%
Reduce debt 6.3% 3.4% 5.6% 4.3% 5.8% 3.3%
Other 8.3% 5.2% 8.7% 5.6% 8.6% 6.3%








4. Saving and Informality Nexus 
 
4.1-Data and Variables 
 
As discussed in the last section, we use data from the Financial Household Survey conducted by 
the Central Bank of Chile. In this section, we present the results for 2007, which covered 3,828 
urban households from the whole country. However, we have only considered those households 
with at least one member employed and have considered only “pure” households where all 
members are either formal or informal, i.e., we exclude households that have some members that 
are formal and others that are informal. Thus, our sample is reduced to between 1,740 and 2,533 
urban households, depending on the used saving rate variable (SR1, SR2 ,SR3, SR4 and SR5) and 
informality definition (ILOD, PD and COMBD). In Section 5, we discuss the estimation results 
for the 2008, 2009 and 2010 surveys.  
The variables that are used in the regression analysis are the saving rates SR1, SR2, SR3, 
SR4 and SR5 that were defined in the last section. In terms of the informality dummy variables, 
we have infILOD, infPD and infCOMBD that are constructed using the ILOD, PD and COMBD 
definitions, respectively. In addition, we have the dprecsav variable that is a dummy variable 
indicating a household that reports having saved during the last year for precautionary motives. 























retirement. The variable ddurgoodsav captures households that have saved in order to buy 
durable goods, and ddebtreducsav captures those households that have saved to pay back loans. 
In addition, for each of these dummy variables, we create new interaction variables with the 
informality variable, namely infprec, Infret, infdurgood and infdebt. For example, infprec 
captures the effect on the saving rate of those households that save for precautionary reasons and 
are informal. 
On top of these variables, we constructed several variables that have been used in the 
surveyed literature in section 2 and whose descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6. Note 
that the descriptive statistics of these variables correspond to the ILOD definition of informality. 
The average age of household heads (age) was 48 years and the average number of household 
members with revenues (minc) was 1.67 persons. The mincsq variable indicates the square of the 
number of people in the household with income. Variable empspo indicates the percentage of 
households in which the household head has a spouse or cohabiting partner who works.  We find 
that 22 percent of households with at least one worker are in this situation. To control for 
dependency rates, two variables were constructed: i) mchild to define the number of members 
under 18 years for each household and ii) melderly to identify the number of family members 
over 65 years. The averages were 0.83 and 0.23 per household, respectively. With regard to the 
gender of the household head, 65 percent are males. For the educational level of the household 
head, four indicator variables were developed: i) primary to define primary education level, ii) 
secondary to define secondary education level, ii) tertoruniv to define college or tertiary 
education level, and iv) postgraduate to define postgraduate education level, with the following 
prevalence rates: 27 percent, 43 percent, 19 percent and 11 percent, respectively.  We further 
constructed a categorical variable indicating households for which the household head is retired 
(hhretired), finding that 11 percent of households have a pensioner as household head. 
Finally, the variable indicating that a household head has a bank account (bankacc) 
shows an average of 18 percent. This variable is important because the Modigliani conceptual 
framework assumes that financial markets operate properly. However, in reality that is not the 
case and, thus, it is important to control for households that do not have proper access to credit 
markets and may have difficulties in smoothing their consumption over their lifetime. A 
dichotomous variable was constructed to indicate whether the household owns at least one 
durable good, i.e., a car, a house or another property (durgood). This variable shows that 79 
26 
 
percent of households have at least one durable good. In addition, we have the thincome variable 
that measures household’s total monthly income expressed in constant millions of 2007 Chilean 
pesos of 2007 and the thincomesq variable that is the square of household’s total monthly 
income, which is supposed to capture non-linearities in the relationship with the saving rate. 
Note that in Section 5 we perform some robustness tests using, instead of the level of income, an 
indicator variable that captures the relative position of households in the income distribution. The 
reason for this robustness test is that, as Sandoval-Hernández (2011) points out, household 
income levels and educational levels are strongly correlated, which may imply the risk of facing 
multicollinearity. 
     
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Regression Analysis 
 
 
       Source: Financial Household Survey 2007, Central Bank of Chile. 
 
Descriptive Statistics (ILO Definition)
Only formal and informal households
Variables Labels mean sd median p10 p90
SR1 Savings rate (definition 1) 0.11 1.04 0.26 -0.39 0.60
SR2 Savings rate (definition 2) -0.05 1.28 0.17 -0.75 0.57
SR3 Savings rate (definition 3) 0.20 1.00 0.34 -0.26 0.64
SR4 Savings rate (definition 4) 0.06 1.19 0.25 -0.57 0.61
SR5 Variable dichotomous (0 not save, 1 saved)-(definition 5) 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 1.00
infILOD Variable dichotomous (0 Formal household; 1 Informal household) 0.34 0.47 0.00 0.00 1.00
age Age of household head 48 13 47 30 66
agesq Age squared of the household head 2,443 1,343 2,209 900 4,356
thincome Total household income (in millions of pesos) 0.791 3.226 0.420 0.181 1.260
thincomesq Square Total household income (in millions of pesos) 11.03 348.80 0.18 0.03 1.59
thincome2 Total household income without pensions (in millions of pesos) 0.733 3.205 0.380 0.155 1.153
thincomesq2 Square Total household income without pensions(in millions of pesos) 10.81 342.16 0.14 0.02 1.33
minc Number of household members with income 1.67 0.79 2.00 1.00 3.00
mincsq Square of number of household members with income 3.40 3.46 4.00 1.00 9.00
empspo Wife or concubine who is employed 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00
mchild Number of children at home 0.83 0.96 1.00 0.00 2.00
melderly Number of elderly at home 0.23 0.54 0.00 0.00 1.00
primary Head of household with primary education 0.27 0.44 0.00 0.00 1.00
secondary Head of household with secondary education 0.43 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00
tertoruniv Head of household with tertiary or university education 0.19 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
postgraduate Head of household with postgraduate education 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
bankacc Head of household who has current account 0.18 0.39 0.00 0.00 1.00
gender Gender of household head 0.65 0.48 1.00 0.00 1.00
durgood Home with durable goods 0.79 0.40 1.00 0.00 1.00
hhretired Head of household is retired 0.11 0.32 0.00 0.00 1.00
dprecsav dummy precautionary saving 0.22 0.41 0.00 0.00 1.00
dretsav dummy retirement saving 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00
ddurgoodsav dummy saving durable goods 0.09 0.29 0.00 0.00 0.00
ddebtreducsav dummy savings debt reduction  0.05 0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00
infret interaction dummy retirement saving and informality 0.04 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.00
infprec interaction dummy precautionary saving and informality 0.06 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00
infdurgood interaction dummy durable goods saving and informality 0.03 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00
infdebt interaction dummy  saving debt reduction and informality 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
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4.2 Empirical Methodology 
 
The objective of this section is to determine whether households of informal workers have 
differential saving behavior relative to households with formal workers. Additionally, the 
relationship between saving and the main determinants commonly cited in the literature is also 
analyzed. The empirical strategy follows a cross-section regression analysis by using both 
ordinary least squares and probit estimation models. It is important to clarify that the estimates 
are made on a population of households containing only formal workers and only informal 
workers according to each of the three possible informality definitions (ILOD, PD and 
COMBD). In other words, in addition to discarding those households that have no member who 
works, we also remove those households that have some members who are formal and others 
who are informal. In this way, we are comparing the saving behavior of purely formal 
households with purely informal households. 
 
4.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares Regression Analysis 
 
We perform the regression analysis for each of the four saving rate definitions as dependent 
variable (SR1, SR2, SR3 and SR4). Further, for each saving rate definition, we test the three 
different informality dummy variables, namely the ILOD, PD and COMBD informality 
definitions. Further, following Butelmann and Gallego (2000), we remove the extreme 
percentiles 1 and 99 for each alternative definition of saving rates in order to ensure appropriate 
empirical treatment since household surveys typically have a high dispersion of data by the 
presence of outliers, which tend to strongly bias the estimation results. 
Concretely, we estimate the following equation by ordinary least squares, weighting with 
the expansion factors given to each household in the EFH and with robust standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity:10 
 
SRi = α0 + α1 infi  + α2 agei  + α3 agesqi + α4 thincomei + α5 thincomesqi + α6 minc i + α7 mincsqi 
+ α8 empspoi + α9 mchildi + α10 melderlyi + α11 secondaryi + α12  tertorunivi + α13 postgraduatei 
+  α16 bankacci + α17 genderi + α18 durgoodi + α19 hhretiredi + α20 Dprecsavi + α21 Dretsavi + α22 
Ddurgoodsavi + α23 Ddebtreducsavi + α24 infpreci + α25 infreti + α26 infdurgoodi + α27 infdebti + 
Єi,                
 
                                                          
10 See Madeira (2011) for a discussion of the computation of population weights for the EFH survey and Solon, 
Haider and Wooldridge (2013) for the use of population weights in studies on causal effects. 
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where the i subscript represent household i, SRi is the SR1, SR2 , SR3  or SR4 definition of saving 
rates, infi  is the informality dummy variable for the ILOD, PD or COMBD definitions of 
informality, and the other variables are the ones described in Subsection 4.1.  
 
4.2.2 Probit Regression Analysis 
 
In the case of the probit regression we use saving definition 5 (SR5) as the dependent variable. In 
addition, we use the three different informality dummy variables, namely the ILOD, PD and 
COMBD informality definitions. Note that we are not removing the extreme percentiles as in the 
OLS regression because SR5 is a dummy variable without the variability of the SR1, SR2, SR3 
and SR4 variables. 
We estimate the following model using a probit regression methodology, correcting the 
standard errors for heteroskedasticity, but without weighting with the expansion factors given to 
each household in the EFH as we did in the OLS regression: 
 
P[SR5i=1] = φ [β0 + β1 infi + β2 agei + β3 agesqi + β4 thincomei + β5 thincomesqi + β6 minci + β7 
mincsqi + β8 empspoi + β9 mchildi + β10  melderlyi + β11  secondaryi + β12 tertorunivi + β13 
postgraduatei + β14 bankacci + β15 genderi + β16  durgoodi + β17 hhretiredi ]        
                              
Note that, given the non-lineal relationship between the dependent variables and its determinants, 
φ is the standard normal cumulative distribution function corresponding to the probit 
methodology. Also, estimating this equation means that we are estimating the probability that the 
dependent variable SR5 is equal to 1, i.e., that a household saved in the last year, conditional on 
the other independent variables. Further, we have not included the dummy variables dprecsavi, 
dretsavi, ddurgoodsavi, ddebtreducsavi, infpreci, infreti, infdurgoodi, and infdebti because these 




4.3.1 OLS Regression Results 
 
Tables 7, 8 and 9 present the estimation results for each of the four definitions of saving rates 
and for each of the three definitions of informality for the year 2007.11 It should be noted that the 
size of the linear coefficients of determination (R2) varies between 0.232 and 0.294. This means 
that between 23.2 percent and 29.4 percent of the variability of saving rates is explained by the 
                                                          
11 In Section 5, we discuss the estimation results for 2008, 2009 and 2010. 
29 
 
dependent variables included in the regressions, which implies that the specification of the 
equations appear to be correct in terms of the results. This is not a minor detail because the R2 of 
the regressions with saving rates from the surveyed papers in Section 2 ranges from 0.03 and 
0.14. 
Table 7 presents the estimation results for each of the four definitions of saving with the 
ILOD definition of informality. In the model using the saving rate definition 1 (SR1), the dummy 
variable indicating households that have only informal workers (infILOD) yields a coefficient of 
-0.124, which turns out to be significant at the 1 percent level. Further, for the SR2 definition, the 
informal household coefficient (infILOD) is -0.202 and significant at the 1 percent level. In 
addition, for the SR3 and SR4 regressions, the coefficients are -0.14 and -0.201, both significant 
at the 1 percent level. These results imply that informal households according to the ILOD 
definition save between 12.4 and 20.2 percentage points less than formal households. 
In Table 8, where the PD definition of informality is used for the four saving regressions, 
we find similar results. We get coefficient values of -0,167, -0,269, -0,19 and -0,257 for the SR1, 
SR2, SR3 and SR4 definitions of saving, respectively, all with a statistical significance level of 1 
percent. Accordingly, for the PD definition of informality, informal households save between 
16.7 and 26.9 percentage points less than formal households. Finally, in Table 9 for the COMBD 
informality definition, the informality dummy coefficient has the values -0.228, -0.337, -0.23 and 
-0.332 for the saving definitions SR1, SR2, SR3 and SR4, respectively, and in all four cases with 
significance levels of 1 percent. These results imply that for the COMBD definition of 
informality informal households save between 22.8 and 33.7 percentage points less than formal 
households. Concluding, for all four definitions of saving rate and all three informality 
definitions, informal households have a lower saving rate than formal households. Note also that 
the negative relationship found between households saving rates and informal workers may also 
be indicating, particularly in the ILOD definition of informality, that there might not be any 
trade-off between pension saving and voluntary household saving. This result is in contrast to the 
one obtained by Butelmann and Gallego (2000). 
Regarding the dummy variables for the stated motives of saving and the corresponding 
interaction variables, we find that the variable infprec is positive and significant, meaning that 
informal household that indicate that they save for precautionary motives saves between 12.8 and 
35.6 percentage points more than other households. When comparing the size of these 
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coefficients with the size of the coefficients of the informality variables infILOD, infPD and 
infCOMBD, we reach the conclusion that informal households that save for precautionary 
motives have saving rates similar to formal households. Note also that the dprecsav is 
insignificant in all specifications, meaning that formal households that state that they save for 
precautionary motives do not have significantly different saving rates than the rest of formal 
households. In addition, there is some evidence that the infdurgood variable is positive and 
significant, meaning that informal households that save for buying a durable good have between 
19.8 and 26.7 percentage points higher saving rates than the rest of informal households.  In 
addition, there is also some evidence that informal households that save for the retirement 
(infret) have between 16.3 and 20 percentage points higher saving rates than other informal 
households. Note that both the ddurgoodsav and dretsav variables are insignificant, which imply 
that formal households that save for either of these motives do not have significantly different 
saving rates than the other formal households. Finally, the other indicator variables capturing the 
motive of reducing debt (ddebtreducsav and infdebtred) are insignificant.   
With regard to the variables that relate to the life cycle hypothesis, age and age squared 
of the household head, we can see that these are significant in three of the four saving 
definitions. Particularly, for saving definitions 2 and 4 (SR2 and SR4) we get negative, and 
significant, values for the age variable, and positive and significant values for the age squared 
variable. Note that these results imply that the age profile of saving rates presents a U form, 
instead of the expected inverted-U form. This result is in line with the findings of Butelmann and 
Gallego (2000) for the Chilean economy, as well as of Sandoval-Hernández (2011) for the 
Mexican economy. One possible explanation for this finding focuses on different saving 
preference structures between generations. 
For all the regression equations we find a positive relationship between the household’s 
income variable thincome and the rates of household saving; i.e., households with higher 
incomes save more. These results are in line with Harris, Loundes and Webster (2002), 
Sandoval-Hernández (2011) and Beckman, Hake and Urvova (2013), among others. Further, we 
included the square of the income variable (thincomesq), which is negative and significant, 
meaning that there is an inverted-U relationship between income and the saving rate. In addition, 
the number of household members with incomes (minc) has a significant and positive 
relationship in most of the estimates, also in line with the results commonly seen in the literature, 
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such as in Sandoval-Hernández (2011). Further, the square of the number of members with 
income (mincsq) is mostly negative and significant, meaning that there is an inverted-U 
relationship between minc and the saving rates. Further, households headed by men seem to save 
between 7.13 and 17.4 percentage points more than those in which the head is a woman, which is 
in line with Attanasio (1998) and Sandoval-Hernández (2011). To control for household 
dependency ratio, two variables are introduced: mchild and melderly. mchild shows a negative 
and statistically significant relationship in all econometric specifications as in Xiao (1996), 
Harris, Loundes and Webster (2002), and Sandoval-Hernández (2011). In terms of the melderly 
variable a negative relationship is found, but it is only statistically significant for saving 
definitions 2 and 4. 
In most studies, educational level has been shown to be an important determinant for 
household saving, with a positive sign. In our study, though, education is insignificant for most 
specifications. This result should nonetheless be taken with caution because household income 
level and educational level are strongly correlated, which may imply the risk of facing 
multicollinearity (Sandoval-Hernández, 2011). Thus, in the robustness section, we estimate these 
models with different indicator variables for the relative position of households in the income 
distribution instead of the continuous income variable. In order to capture the effect of 
households not restricted to credit, a dichotomous variable, bankacc, indicating household heads 
that have bank account, is defined. In most specifications, this variable is insignificant. For the 
variable capturing households that own durable goods, we find highly significant results in all 
three specifications with the same positive sign as most studies (Attanasio, 1998; Butelmann and 
Gallego, 2000; Harris et al., 2002; and Sandoval-Hernandez, 2011). This result may be explained 
by taking into account that most durable goods are bought on credit, which imply that 
households need to save more in order to pay for that credit. 
The variable hhretired shows a statistically significant relationship in almost all cases, 
but the sign of the coefficient varies depending on the definition of saving that is used. While for 
saving definitions 1 and 3 the sign is positive, for saving definitions 2 and 4 it is negative. This 
apparently contradictory result may be justified by taking into account that saving definitions 2 













* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Econometric methodology: Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors.
Source: Financial Household Survey 2007. Central Bank of Chile
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                                                        
F                           15.87                        16.09                        19.27                        17.14                
Adjusted R-squared          0.245                        0.232                        0.261                        0.251                
Observations                 2355                         2345                         2350                         2346                
                                                                                                                                        
Constant                  -0.0665         (-0.51)       0.0911          (0.53)      -0.0790         (-0.71)       0.0626          (0.41)
thincomesq2                                            -0.0101***      (-9.46)                                  -0.00950***      (-8.96)
thincome2                                                0.293***      (10.88)                                     0.271***       (9.92)
infdebtred                 -0.142         (-1.40)       -0.120         (-1.14)       -0.110         (-1.13)      -0.0918         (-0.94)
ddebtreducsav              0.0320          (0.72)       0.0371          (0.78)       0.0103          (0.27)       0.0264          (0.64)
infdurgood                  0.202**        (2.18)        0.219**        (2.10)        0.113          (1.57)        0.198**        (1.98)
ddurgoodsav               -0.0933         (-1.41)      -0.0696         (-0.99)      -0.0256         (-0.76)      -0.0738         (-1.05)
infprec                     0.136**        (2.57)        0.213***       (2.66)        0.136***       (2.80)        0.193**        (2.56)
dprecsav                  0.00733          (0.26)      -0.0365         (-0.78)      -0.0122         (-0.47)      -0.0506         (-1.09)
infret                      0.101          (1.15)      -0.0129         (-0.12)       0.0605          (0.72)      -0.0402         (-0.44)
dretsav                   -0.0642         (-1.47)      -0.0391         (-0.80)      -0.0243         (-0.78)      0.00322          (0.08)
hhretired                   0.169***       (4.95)       -0.117*        (-1.91)        0.175***       (5.48)      -0.0849         (-1.48)
durgood                     0.141***       (4.01)        0.262***       (5.00)        0.141***       (4.52)        0.249***       (5.07)
gender                     0.0998***       (3.11)        0.164***       (4.22)       0.0714***       (2.72)        0.144***       (3.92)
bankacc                   -0.0964***      (-2.60)       -0.111***      (-2.66)      -0.0533         (-1.60)      -0.0562         (-1.50)
postgraduate             -0.00666         (-0.15)      -0.0562         (-1.03)      -0.0344         (-0.58)      -0.0541         (-0.90)
tertoruniv                -0.0165         (-0.41)      -0.0438         (-0.76)     -0.00559         (-0.16)      -0.0216         (-0.39)
secondary                 -0.0395         (-1.11)      -0.0118         (-0.27)      -0.0292         (-1.00)     -0.00283         (-0.07)
melderly                  -0.0324         (-1.43)      -0.0964***      (-3.01)      -0.0308         (-1.40)      -0.0976***      (-3.18)
mchild                    -0.0833***      (-4.40)      -0.0793***      (-3.66)      -0.0412***      (-3.61)      -0.0560***      (-2.63)
empspo                    -0.0214         (-0.58)       0.0477          (1.10)      -0.0148         (-0.50)       0.0323          (0.74)
mincsq                    -0.0470***      (-3.55)      -0.0291         (-1.38)      -0.0519***      (-3.60)      -0.0249         (-1.41)
minc                        0.317***       (4.59)        0.192**        (2.02)        0.315***       (5.11)        0.167**        (2.04)
thincomesq               -0.00719***      (-9.35)                                  -0.00696***      (-8.18)                             
thincome                    0.206***      (10.58)                                     0.196***       (8.44)                             
agesq                   0.0000723          (1.53)     0.000197***       (2.89)    0.0000343          (0.83)     0.000133**        (2.19)
age                       -0.0101**       (-2.12)      -0.0220***      (-3.35)     -0.00601         (-1.46)      -0.0156***      (-2.64)
infILOD                    -0.124***      (-3.25)       -0.202***      (-4.33)       -0.140***      (-4.02)       -0.201***      (-4.74)
                                                                                                                                        
                        Model SR1                    Model SR2                    Model SR3                    Model SR4                
                                                                                                                                        














* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Econometric methodology: Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors.
Source: Financial Household Survey 2007. Central Bank of Chile
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                                                        
F                           15.36                        15.00                        19.10                        17.84                
Adjusted R-squared          0.250                        0.237                        0.261                        0.254                
Observations                 2533                         2526                         2532                         2527                
                                                                                                                                        
Constant                   0.0421          (0.31)        0.167          (0.98)      -0.0223         (-0.19)        0.113          (0.75)
thincomesq2                                           -0.00631***      (-5.70)                                  -0.00557***      (-5.47)
thincome2                                                0.234***       (8.48)                                     0.203***       (7.94)
infdebtred2               -0.0401         (-0.33)       0.0287          (0.23)      -0.0608         (-0.54)      0.00266          (0.02)
ddebtreducsav              0.0377          (0.96)       0.0546          (1.19)       0.0378          (1.36)       0.0472          (1.54)
infdurgood2                -0.108         (-0.62)      -0.0181         (-0.10)      0.00832          (0.06)      -0.0538         (-0.31)
ddurgoodsav               0.00798          (0.24)       0.0299          (0.75)      0.00811          (0.29)       0.0174          (0.52)
infprec2                    0.106          (1.60)        0.238***       (2.80)        0.128**        (2.15)        0.198***       (2.80)
dprecsav                   0.0120          (0.48)      -0.0356         (-0.82)     -0.00449         (-0.19)      -0.0150         (-0.52)
infret2                     0.163**        (2.06)    -0.000236         (-0.00)        0.171**        (2.31)       0.0338          (0.36)
dretsav                   -0.0551         (-1.02)      -0.0271         (-0.48)      -0.0424         (-0.82)      -0.0201         (-0.39)
hhretired                   0.160***       (4.68)       -0.131**       (-2.23)        0.157***       (5.04)      -0.0961*        (-1.75)
durgood                     0.115***       (3.56)        0.244***       (4.91)        0.130***       (4.58)        0.216***       (5.34)
gender                     0.0993***       (3.34)        0.174***       (4.74)       0.0713***       (2.84)        0.135***       (4.34)
bankacc                   -0.0552         (-1.55)      -0.0565         (-1.41)      -0.0244         (-0.76)      -0.0239         (-0.68)
postgraduate              -0.0306         (-0.75)      -0.0946*        (-1.84)     -0.00406         (-0.11)      -0.0260         (-0.55)
tertoruniv                -0.0684*        (-1.74)       -0.110**       (-2.01)      -0.0392         (-1.10)      -0.0330         (-0.75)
secondary                 -0.0570*        (-1.69)      -0.0470         (-1.12)      -0.0406         (-1.38)      -0.0194         (-0.50)
melderly                  -0.0201         (-0.90)      -0.0865***      (-2.74)      -0.0259         (-1.27)      -0.0971***      (-3.24)
mchild                    -0.0720***      (-4.31)      -0.0741***      (-3.87)      -0.0362***      (-3.32)      -0.0513***      (-2.84)
empspo                    -0.0340         (-1.06)       0.0396          (1.00)      -0.0146         (-0.54)       0.0303          (0.80)
mincsq                    -0.0551***      (-4.47)      -0.0338*        (-1.78)      -0.0466***      (-4.50)      -0.0215         (-1.43)
minc                        0.338***       (5.49)        0.195**        (2.28)        0.293***       (5.65)        0.148**        (2.06)
thincomesq               -0.00453***      (-5.73)                                  -0.00412***      (-5.43)                             
thincome                    0.165***       (8.32)                                     0.147***       (7.65)                             
agesq                   0.0000952*         (1.95)     0.000198***       (2.94)    0.0000440          (1.04)     0.000125**        (2.12)
age                       -0.0127***      (-2.65)      -0.0223***      (-3.47)     -0.00666         (-1.62)      -0.0145***      (-2.59)
infPD                      -0.167***      (-3.58)       -0.269***      (-4.75)       -0.190***      (-4.46)       -0.257***      (-4.93)
                                                                                                                                        
                        Model SR1                    Model SR2                    Model SR3                    Model SR4                
                                                                                                                                        
Saving Rates Equations with Productive Definition of labor informality
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4.3.2 OLS Regressions Discriminating Between Positive and Negative Saving Rates 
 
In this subsection we present results for the same OLS estimation methodology as in the previous 
subsection, but we discriminate between those households that have positive and negative saving 
rates, i.e., we have estimation results for two separate groups. Note that a negative saving rate 
implies that the household is dissaving that year either by selling assets or borrowing. In Table 
10 we present the results for the subset of households with positive saving rates. For the 
COMBD definition of informality, we find that the informality variable is not significant, 
implying that there is no difference between informal and formal households for the group of 
households that have positive saving rates. This result is corroborated for the other two 
informality definitions, with the exception of the specification using the SR3 saving definition 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Econometric methodology: Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors.
Source: Financial Household Survey 2007. Central Bank of Chile
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                                                        
F                           15.60                        15.19                        19.58                        17.22                
Adjusted R-squared          0.261                        0.263                        0.294                        0.284                
Observations                 1742                         1742                         1742                         1740                
                                                                                                                                        
Constant                  -0.0766         (-0.47)        0.225          (1.05)      -0.0987         (-0.73)        0.178          (0.93)
thincomesq2                                           -0.00950***      (-8.81)                                  -0.00858***      (-8.65)
thincome2                                                0.270***      (10.22)                                     0.239***       (9.64)
infdebtred3               -0.0775         (-0.50)      -0.0379         (-0.25)      -0.0913         (-0.65)      -0.0493         (-0.36)
ddebtreducsav              0.0366          (0.71)       0.0386          (0.67)       0.0344          (0.98)       0.0345          (0.80)
infdurgood3                 0.236**        (1.97)        0.267*         (1.94)        0.169          (1.47)        0.219 *         (1.70)
ddurgoodsav               -0.0439         (-0.94)      -0.0123         (-0.24)      -0.0307         (-0.83)      -0.0116         (-0.25)
infprec3                    0.219***       (2.91)        0.356***       (3.32)        0.204***       (2.97)        0.324***       (3.31)
dprecsav                  0.00759          (0.24)      -0.0458         (-0.85)      -0.0134         (-0.47)      -0.0633         (-1.17)
infret3                     0.200**        (2.41)      0.00548          (0.04)        0.164**        (2.37)      0.00904          (0.09)
dretsav                   -0.0693         (-1.38)      -0.0394         (-0.70)      -0.0278         (-0.81)      0.00470          (0.11)
hhretired                   0.171***       (4.48)       -0.136*        (-1.90)        0.167***       (4. 98)       -0.108         (-1.59)
durgood                     0.166***       (4.15)        0.283***       (4.77)        0.145***       (4.41)        0.276***       (4.90)
gender                     0.0896**        (2.57)        0.152***       (3.49)       0.0713**        (2.37)        0.120***       (2.96)
bankacc                   -0.0802*        (-1.79)      -0.0770         (-1.52)      -0.0485         (-1.23)      -0.0353         (-0.77)
postgraduate              -0.0444         (-0.91)       -0.107*        (-1.83)     -0.00513         (-0.11)      -0.0586         (-1.09)
tertoruniv                -0.0527         (-1.11)       -0.114*        (-1.65)      -0.0151         (-0.34)      -0.0772         (-1.16)
secondary                 -0.0732*        (-1.81)      -0.0757         (-1.52)      -0.0 413         (-1.15)      -0.0533         (-1.17)
melderly                 -0.00468         (-0.18)      -0.0767*        (-1.92)      -0.0106         (-0.44)      -0.0755**       (-2.00)
mchild                    -0.0634***      (-4.35)      -0.0567***      (-3.02)      -0.0383***      (-3.03)      -0.0286*        (-1.67)
empspo                     0.0393          (1.04)        0.115**        (2.50)       0.0384          (1.22)        0.123***       (2.84)
mincsq                    -0.0319**       (-2.08)      0.00345          (0.16)      -0.0365***      (-2.75)      0.00554          (0.26)
minc                        0.228***       (2.96)       0.0372          (0.38)        0.245***       (3.77)       0.0214          (0.23)
thincomesq               -0.00704***      (-8.86)                                  -0.00639***      (-8.79)                             
thincome                    0.198***       (9.75)                                     0.175***       (9.52)                             
agesq                   0.0000465          (0.77)     0.000197**        (2.34)    0.0000125          (0.25)     0.000143*         (1.87)
age                      -0.00662         (-1.09)      -0.0212** *      (-2.60)     -0.00292         (-0.57)      -0.0152**       (-2.09)
infCOMBD                   -0.228***      (-3.70)       -0.337***      (-4.66)       -0.230***      (-4.18)       -0.332***      (-5.03)
                                                                                                                                        
                        Model SR1                    Model SR2                    Model SR3                    Model SR4                
                                                                                                                                        
Saving Rates Equations with Combined Definition of labor informality
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with the ILOD definition of informality where it is negative and significant.12 In Table 11 we 
present the regression results for the subset of households with negative saving rates, i.e., which 
dissave. For the COMBD definition of informality, we find that the informality variable is 
negative and significant, meaning that informal households have lower saving rates than formal 
households. While this result is corroborated for the PD definition of informality, for the ILOD 
definition we find that the difference between formal and informal households is insignificant. 
Concluding, these results show some evidence that the negative relationship between saving 
rates and informality is stronger for the group of households that have negative saving rates. 
More results and tests should be carried out, however, in order to draw further conclusions. 
 
Table 10. Saving Rates Regressions for Households with Positive Saving Rates 




                                                          
12 Note that we are only presenting the estimation results for the COMBD definition of informality due to space 
considerations. However, the results for the other informality definitions are available from the authors upon 
request.  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Econometric methodology: Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors.
Source: Financial Household Survey 2007. Central Bank of Chile
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                                                        
F                           21.89                        19.49                        22.10                        21.90                
Adjusted R-squared          0.277                        0.261                        0.293                        0.291                
Observations                 1425                         1299                         1528                         1406                
                                                                                                                                        
Constant                    0.531***       (7.34)        0.456***       (6.16)        0.406***       (5.65)        0.445***       (5.92)
thincomesq2                                           -0.00380***     (-12.05)                                  -0.00420***     (-11.92)
thincome2                                                0.103***      (11.84)                                     0.112***      (11.73)
infdebtred3                0.0487          (0.58)        0.196***       (3.16)       0.0865          (0.99)        0.233***       (4.14)
ddebtreducsav             -0.0227         (-0.94)      -0.0336         (-1.32)      -0.0485         (-1.52)      -0.0587*        (-1.80)
infdurgood3               -0.0205         (-0.37)      -0.0115         (-0.22)       0.0138          (0.29)      -0.0164         (-0.32)
ddurgoodsav               0.00922          (0.52)       0.0188          (1.06)      0.00254          (0.14)       0.0135          (0.74)
infprec3                 -0.00780         (-0.19)       0.0259          (0.68)      0.00694          (0.18)       0.0415          (1.10)
dprecsav                   0.0141          (1.00)      0.00469          (0.30)      0.00374          (0.26)      -0.0107         (-0.65)
infret3                   -0.0378         (-0.79)      -0.0300         (-0.52)      -0.0109         (-0.23)      -0.0629         (-1.11)
dretsav                  -0.00862         (-0.43)      -0.0182         (-0.84)      -0.0232         (-1.07)      -0.0148         (-0.69)
hhretired                  0.0406          (1.54)      -0.0356         (-1.12)       0.0423          (1.62)      -0.0369         (-1.31)
durgood                    0.0742***       (4.70)       0.0590***       (3.79)       0.0663***       (4.19)       0.0514***       (3.33)
gender                     0.0104          (0.78)       0.0169          (1.21)       0.0223*         (1.71)       0.0324**        (2.37)
bankacc                  -0.00458         (-0.28)      -0.0110         (-0.60)      0.00327          (0.19)    -0.000223         (-0.01)
postgraduate              -0.0343         (-1.46)      -0.0179         (-0.71)     -0.00275         (-0.12)       0.0105          (0.42)
tertoruniv                -0.0164         (-0.71)     -0.00969         (-0.38)     0.000933          (0.04)      0.00785          (0.30)
secondary                 -0.0320*        (-1.76)      -0.0259         (-1.34)      -0.0235         (-1.31)      -0.0123         (-0.65)
melderly                  -0.0194         (-1.24)      -0.0483***      (-3.24)     -0.00426         (-0.30)      -0.0705***      (-4.61)
mchild                    -0.0467***      (-7.39)      -0.0438***      (-6.51)      -0.0349***      (-5.01)      -0.0291***      (-3.97)
empspo                    0.00974          (0.64)       0.0223          (1.44)       0.0158          (1.06)       0.0291*         (1.87)
mincsq                    0.00830          (1.38)      0.00248          (0.39)      0.00195          (0.32)    -0.000499         (-0.08)
minc                       0.0130          (0.43)       0.0306          (0.96)       0.0400          (1.31)       0.0395          (1.21)
thincomesq               -0.00366***     (-12.05)                                  -0.00397***     (-12.02)                             
thincome                   0.0990***      (12.01)                                     0.105***      (12.20)                             
agesq                   0.0000957***       (3.20)    0.0000794**        (2.55)    0.0000456          (1.54)    0.0000885***       (2.85)
age                       -0.0110***      (-4.01)     -0.00913***      (-3.17)     -0.00607**       (-2.22)     -0.00926***      (-3.22)
infCOMBD                 -0.00116         (-0.05)      0.00715          (0.30)      -0.0253         (-1.14)     -0.00250         (-0.11)
                                                                                                                                        
                        Model SR1                    Model SR2                    Model SR3                    Model SR4                
                                                                                                                                        




Table 11. Saving Rates Regressions for Households with Negative Saving Rates 




4.3.3 Probit Regression Results 
 
The estimation results for the probit regression analysis for year 2007 are presented in Table 12. 
For the variables indicating households that belong to informal households, we find negative and 
significant results at the 1 percent level for the ILOD definition of informality (infILOD) and at 
the 10 percent level for the COMBD definition of informality (infCOMBD). In terms of the 
marginal effects for these estimations given the average value for the other independent 
variables, we find that households with informal workers have a between 8.31 and 9.13 percent 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Econometric methodology: Ordinary Least Squares with robust standard errors.
Source: Financial Household Survey 2007. Central Bank of Chile
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                                                                        
F                           2.459                        3.861                        2.141                        3.647                
Adjusted R-squared          0.118                        0.151                        0.121                        0.161                
Observations                  313                          438                          208                          329                
                                                                                                                                        
Constant                   -0.404         (-0.93)       -0.740*        (-1.83)        0.167          (0.31)       -0.222         (-0.52)
thincomesq2                                             -0.393***      (-3.63)                                    -0.459**       (-2.09)
thincome2                                                1.188***       (4.36)                                     1.120**        (2.53)
infdebtred3               -0.0616         (-0.39)      0.00743          (0.05)     -0.00527         (-0.04)      -0.0305         (-0.19)
ddebtreducsav               0.182**        (1.98)        0.209**        (2.46)        0.175          (1.61)        0.209**        (2.24)
infdurgood3                 0.104          (0.52)        0.229          (1.17)       -0.125         (-0.59)        0.159           (0.74)
ddurgoodsav               -0.0132         (-0.10)       0.0796          (0.62)        0.126          (0.90)        0.113          (0.70)
infprec3                   0.0703          (0.55)        0.365*         (1.93)       0.0701          (0.51)        0.440**        (2.07)
dprecsav                    0.118*         (1.73)      -0.0369         (-0.27)       0.0639          (0.84)       -0.136         (-0.77)
infret3                     0.213          (1.15)       0.0236          (0.10)       0.0521          (0.23)      -0.0419         (-0.23)
dretsav                   -0.0409         (-0.29)       0.0559          (0.47)    -0.000579         (-0.00)        0.171          (1.38)
hhretired                   0.264**        (2.53)       -0.135         (-1.46)        0.395***       (2. 61)       -0.139         (-1.60)
durgood                    0.0513          (0.63)        0.184**        (2.07)       0.0640          (0.84)        0.206**        (2.37)
gender                     0.0937          (1.18)        0.113          (1.47)       0.0824          (0.90)       0.0538          (0.64)
bankacc                    -0.279**       (-2.10)       -0.287**       (-2.34)       -0.210         (-1.29)       -0.199         (-1.31)
postgraduate               -0.163         (-1.16)       -0.223*        (-1.83)       -0.415**       (-2.42)       -0.155         (-1.04)
tertoruniv                 -0.175         (-1.57)       -0.274*        (-1.97)       -0.267*        (-1.89)       -0.366**       (-1.99)
secondary                  -0.170*        (-1.67)       -0.153*        (-1.71)       -0. 217**       (-2.09)       -0.169*        (-1.86)
melderly                   0.0631          (0.90)       0.0227          (0.36)        0.139*         (1.70)      0.00113          (0.02)
mchild                     0.0351          (1.14)       0.0384          (1.07)       0.0470          (1.48)       0.0629*         (1.65)
empspo                    -0.0364         (-0.38)       0.0379          (0.46)      0.00719          (0.07)        0.105          (1.06)
mincsq                     0.0301          (0.54)     -0.00633         (-0.10)       0.0384          (0.61)      -0.0327         (-0.48)
minc                       -0.130         (-0.49)      -0.0307         (-0.12)       -0.185         (-0.61)      0.00426          (0.02)
thincomesq                 -0.182*        (-1.94)                                     0.174          (0.83)                             
thincome                    0.652**        (2.56)                                   -0.0375         (-0.08)                             
agesq                   0.0000574          (0.32)    0.0000776          (0.50)     0.000132          (0.67)     0.000249          (1.57)
age                      -0.00355         (-0.21)     -0.00456         (-0.30)      -0.0133         (-0.74)      -0.0216         (-1.40)
infCOMBD                   -0.240**       (-2.08)       -0.289***      (-2.80)       -0.258**       (-2.28)       -0.269***      (-2.60)
                                                                                                                                        
                        Model SR1                    Model SR2                    Model SR3                    Model SR4                
                                                                                                                                        
Saving Rates Equations with Combined Definition of labor informality
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lower probability of saving than households with only formal workers.13 In the case of the PD 
definition, we do not find that the variable infPD is significant. 
 




For the income variables thincome and thincomesq, we find similar results to the OLS 
results from last section. Household income and the probability of saving appear to have an 
inverted-U relationship, which means that the probability of saving is increasing to household 
income but at a decreasing rate. In the case of the age variables (age and agesq), we only find 
that it is significant at the 5 percent level for the ILOD definition but not for the other definitions, 
which means that we cannot establish a clear pattern for age and saving. For the household 
dependency ratio mchild, we find that households with children have a significantly lower 
probability of saving at the 1 percent level for all three informality definitions. In addition, we 
find a positive, and significant at the 1 percent level, relationship between the probability of 
saving and the variable bankacc, i.e., household heads that have a bank account. Note that this 
relationship was insignificant in the OLS estimations. The possession of durable goods 
                                                          
13 The calculations of the marginal effects are not presented due to space considerations but are available upon 
request from the authors. 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Econometric methodology: probit.
Source: Financial Household Survey 2007. Central Bank of Chile
Standard errors in parentheses
                                                                                                           
Pseudo R-squared            0.136                        0.117                        0.149                
Observations                 1550                         1672                         1137                
                                                                                                           
Constant                    0.382         (0.449)       -0.165         (0.423)       0.0290         (0.549)
infCOMBD                                                                             -0.229*        (0.130)
infPD                                                   -0.163         (0.105)                             
hhretired                  0.0863         (0.136)     -0.00954         (0.128)      -0.0342         (0.168)
durgood                     0.514***     (0.0986)        0.522***     (0.0952)        0.475***      (0.114)
gender                    -0.0757        (0.0713)      -0.0178        (0.0682)       -0.128        (0.0835)
bankacc                     0.245***     (0.0911)        0.310***     (0.0841)        0.262**       (0.105)
postgraduate               0.0473         (0.135)        0.317**       (0.131)        0.169         (0.163)
tertoruniv                 0.0198         (0.123)        0.139         (0.122)       0.0221         (0.154)
secondary                  -0.137         (0.107)      -0.0625         (0.107)      -0.0572         (0.131)
melderly                 -0.00720        (0.0842)      0.00933        (0.0787)     -0.00227         (0.104)
mchild                     -0.235***     (0.0383)       -0.210***     (0.0358)       -0.257***     (0.0452)
empspo                     0.0553        (0.0892)       0.0911        (0.0834)     -0.00135         (0.107)
mincsq                    -0.0411        (0.0361)      -0.0333        (0.0310)      -0.0754        (0.0471)
minc                       0.0797         (0.176)       0.0504         (0.158)        0.238         (0.219)
thincomesq              -1.63e-14***   (2.98e-15)    -3.59e-15**    (1.65e-15)    -1.62e-14***   (3.32e-15)
thincome              0.000000305***   (5.02e-08)  0.000000114***   (3.48e-08)  0.000000305***   (5.78e-08)
agesq                    0.000224      (0.000184)     0.000111      (0.000175)     0.000119      (0.000224)
age                       -0.0353**      (0.0173)      -0.0194        (0.0164)      -0.0252        (0.0209)
infILOD                    -0.254***     (0.0814)                                                          
SR5                                                                                                        
                                                                                                           
                       Model ILOD                     Model PD                  Model COMBD                




(durgood) is positively and significantly related at the 1 percent level with the probability of 
saving. Note that we have not included the dummy variables that capture the motives for saving 
and their interaction with the informality variables because these variables and the dependent 
variable SR5 are constructed from the same survey questions. 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
 
In this section we make several robustness tests in order to verify the stability and significance of 
our main results. The main robustness test was to estimate the same models but using the EFH 
surveys for 2008, 2009 and 2010. Note that while the 2007 survey considers urban households in 
the whole country, the other years consider only urban households from the metropolitan region 
of Santiago de Chile. In addition, for all these years we estimated the models using different 
subsamples of the data.14  
In the case of the OLS estimation, we find that for 2008, 2009 and 2010, the informality 
variable is still negative and significant for 32 out of 36 different specifications, corroborating 
the main OLS results. In the case of the probit regressions, for 2008 we find that all the 
coefficients for the informality variables become insignificant. Further, for year 2009 we only 
find that the informality variable is negative and significant for the ILOD definition, but not for 
the PD and COMBD definitions. Note that we could not estimate the model for the year 2010 
because the survey did not include the necessary questions to build the SR5 definition of saving. 
Regarding the OLS results when splitting the data between households that have positive 
saving rates and those that have negative saving rates, we confirm for 2008, 2009 and 2010 the 
baseline results. For the subgroup of positive saving rates, we find that in only 2 out of 36 
specifications is the informality variable significant. For the rest of the specifications (34 out of 
36), we find that the informality variable is insignificant. In the case of the subgroup of 
households with negative saving rates, we find that the informality variable is negative and 
significant in 10 out of 36 different specifications and that it is insignificant in 26 out of 36 
specifications. These results confirm that it seems that informal households that dissave (with 
negative saving rate) that have the largest difference in terms of saving behavior with formal 
households. Note, however, that while most results for the split sample show a non-significant 
relationship between saving and informality, for the merged sample the results show a robust 
                                                          
14 We do not present the results due to space considerations but they are available from the authors upon request. 
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negative relationship between saving and informality. This fact may show that the sample size 
may be important and that more research is needed in order to draw further conclusions. 
Another robustness check that we made was to estimate the OLS model for a subsample 
of observations that excluded households belonging to deciles 9 and 10, i.e., with high incomes. 
The rationale was to avoid possible distortions in the results by the saving behavior of self-
employed high income earners that do not contribute to a pension plan, and thus are considered 
informal workers according to the ILOD definition, but may have a distinct behavior given their 
income levels.15  For the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010, we found that the informality variable 
was significant in 10 out of 12 specification, 6 out of 12, 0 of 12 and 0 of 12, respectively. These 
results show that the negative relationship between the saving rate and the dummy variable is 
weakened when not considering high-income households. More research is needed, however, 
before drawing further conclusions because the sample size is considerably reduced, which 
generates doubts whether the weakening of the relationship is due to the elimination of higher- 
income households or due to the reduction in sample size. Note that the reduction in sample size 
is a consequence of the EFH survey being heavily focused on surveying higher-income 
households. 
Additionally, we made a robustness test by including in the dataset those households that 
had both informal and formal workers. Recall that these households had been eliminated from 
the dataset. We treated these households as informal households. The main results regarding the 
difference between informal and formal households’ saving behavior were maintained. However, 
although the coefficient for the informality dummy variable was negative and significant for all 
definitions of informality and all saving variables, the size of the coefficient diminished.  
In terms of the other variables, our robustness tests, both for the OLS and probit 
regressions, indicate that the income variable, measured both as a continues variable for the level 
of household income and a categorical variable for the relative position in the income 
distribution, is one of the most important and robust determinant of saving. On top of using the 
level of household income, we constructed several indicator variables capturing different income 
deciles, i.e., the relative position in the income distribution. The reason for using this dummy 
strategy is that, as Sandoval-Hernández (2011) points out, household income level and  
educational level are strongly correlated, which may imply the risk of facing multicollinearity. 
                                                          
15 Recall that contributing to a pension plan is not mandatory for self-employed in Chile until 2015. 
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Other variables that showed robust and significant results across the different robustness tests 
were the child dependency ratio (mchild), which had a negative relationship with saving, and the 




The purpose of this paper is to compare the saving behavior of formal and informal workers. 
Further, we provide a socioeconomic and financial characterization for these workers. We use 
the Financial Household Survey conducted by the Central Bank of Chile for the years 2007, 
2008, 2009 and 2010 that covers between 1,740 and 2,533 urban households. For the saving 
variable we have used five different definitions and for the informality variable we have used 
three different definitions. In terms of the cross-section estimation methodology, we have used 
an OLS model and a probit model.  
The regression results tend to indicate that informal households save less than formal 
households. Although this conclusion is robust to most specifications, there are some results that 
indicate a non-significant difference. We also find evidence that those informal households that 
in the survey questioner declare saving for precautionary motives have higher saving rates than 
the other informal households. In addition, we also find evidence that those informal households 
that report saving in order to buy durable goods or for retirement also have higher saving rates. 
Further, the estimation results for the other determinants of saving are in line with the literature 
on saving, being the most relevant determinant the income level. In addition, the descriptive data 
indicate that informal workers seem to have less access to financial services and possess less 
financial assets and liabilities. 
Putting forward some tentative explanations for the differential behavior in terms of 
saving between informal and formal households, one possible explanation is that informal 
households are less risk averse than formal households. Thus, they prefer consuming a higher 
proportion of their income and have lower saving rates than formal households. It might be that 
informal households are more used to having short-term temporary jobs and a more variable 
income stream than formal households. Thus, this experience of living in a more volatile 
environment may end up influencing their risk aversion preferences. Note that our results do not 
support the hypothesis that informal households have higher saving rates than formal households 
due to precautionary saving given the higher variability of the income stream of informal 
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households. We find, however, support the idea that the saving rates of informal households that 
state that they save for precautionary motives is higher than other informal households.   
In terms of policy implications, it seems that combating informality may not only 
improve the well-being of workers, but may also have positive consequences on the aggregate 
saving rate. However, we should be careful with this tentative conclusion as more research is 
needed, especially in terms of understanding why informal households save less than formal 
households. In addition, for Chile, it is evident that there is ample space to improve access to 
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